I brief and argue civil appeals in the Texas Supreme Court, Texas intermediate appellate courts, the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court. I write friend-of-the-court (“amicus”) briefs for interested persons, organizations, and entities.
My real estate trial work includes HOA law, fraud, construction disputes, and mortgage/foreclosure disputes. I never represent HOA's or banks, and I don't sue consumers.
My trial and appellate work has included numerous class actions and statewide multi-district litigation (MDL) proceedings against major banks.
TRENDING: SHORT-TERM RENTALS
One issue that is heating up is whether city ordinances that ban short-term rentals are vulnerable to legal challenge. I believe they are, and on several constitutional grounds. A Texas appeals court in Houston recently allowed such a challenge to proceed based on the theory that imposing such an ordinance on a homeowner who purchased based on STR rights had it taken away — an unfair “taking” of property. See Village of Tiki Island v. Ronquille, 463 S.W.3d 562, 565 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2015).
The City of Austin may or may not have a rational basis for banning STR’s, but it hasn’t done that. Instead, it has picked out one, vague, arbitrary, insupportable category of lessors — “non-owner-occupants” — and banned only that one category from engaging in STR’s. I doubt there’s any rational basis for the City of Austin’s actions; I doubt that “owner-occupied” has any clear meaning, or if it does, that the classification form a legitimate basis for denying equal protection to those who do not, at a particular moment in time, live in the properties they own. No property owner or property lessor lives in a property when it’s being rented out; every lessee or sub-lessee is a “non-owner-occupant.”
Austin’s STR ordinance also bans owners from advertising their property anywhere in the world if they don’t have an Austin STR license, which seems to me an unconstitutionally broad gag on free speech.
Another issue is whether millions of Texans have been unwittingly violating deed restrictions for decades because they did not anticipate that the typical requirement of “residential use” imposes some minimum duration on leasing. If so, all these people are subject to retroactive enforcement actions by neighbors and HOA’s, which seems to me untenable. I have been fighting these cases on behalf of homeowner rights for years, but they have recently begun moving into appeals.
TEXAS SUPREME COURT UPDATE: HOMEOWNER WIN UPHELD IN ZGABAY V. RIVER CHASE PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION !!
In this important case, the Texas Third Court of Appeals in Austin held on August 28, 2015, that the “residential use” requirement in most deed restrictions DOES NOT BAN SHORT-TERM RENTALS. The key reason why is that absent clear limitations on lease duration, the traditional rule of construing restrictive covenants to favor the free use of land controls. That is a vital rule for property owners subject to the whims of HOA boards. The case is Zgabay v. NBRC Property Owners Assoc., No. 03-14-00660 (Tex. App. — Austin August 28, 2015).
On April 1, 2016, the Texas Supreme Court declined the HOA’s request to take up the case and reverse the court of appeals. The Zgabay decision is now controlling precedent in the Austin appellate district and should prove influential elsewhere in Texas.
Homeowner appeal in TARR V. TIMBERWOOD PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION (BEXAR COUNTY):
The HOA, which assumed the role of enforcer of the deed restrictions and fined Mr. Tarr for renting out his home for short terms, asserted that the deed restrictions ban short-term rentals. Mr. Tarr sued to block the enforcement action and the fines and asked the court to declare the meaning of the restrictive covenants. Despite the homeowner victory in Zgabay, reported above and involving essentially identical facts, the County Court at Law in Bexar County granted summary judgment to the HOA in an order almost identical to that reversed by the Austin Court of Appeals. The homeowner’s opening brief has now been filed. The brief argues, among other things, that the HOA in that case larded the judgment with various kinds of relief it never actually pled, and that in any event the HOA’s argument that a short duration of use is always a “business” use defies reason and logic.
I presently have multiple other essentially identical STR cases pending in trial courts in the appellate districts of Austin and San Antonio. They all boil down to whether bare “residential use only” wording, without more, bars short-term rentals. For whatever reason, HOA’s and those opposed to STR’s don’t accept the Zgabay decision and appear willing to continue refusing to amend deed restrictions and instead litigate their existing deed restrictions. As I have pointed out in briefs, if “residential use” wording has all along banned STR’s, then homeowners all over Texas have been violating the deed restrictions for decades without knowing it. I have great difficulty believing that the appellate courts will allow such a result when nothing in bare “residential use” wording gives fair notice that a duration limit applies to leasing.